By Katarina Mirkovic
The energy transition does not “disrupt” long-term energy contracts so much as it renders visible what they have always contained: an uneasy bargain between expectations of stability and the inevitability of regulatory evolution. If stability is treated as the immobilisation of the legal framework, it will predictably fail, and it will fail in the familiar way: by translating political disagreement into compensable loss. This article proposes a different view. Stability, here, is the preservation of the bargain through legally structured adjustment. On that basis, it revisits stabilization clauses as techniques of risk allocation and valuation, and only exceptionally as devices that could plausibly constrain regulatory change. It then argues that investor-state arbitration, whatever its virtues in allocating responsibility ex post, is poorly equipped to manage contractual equilibrium under accelerated “change in law”. The alternative explored is contractual: dispute avoidance through Dispute Avoidance and Adjudication Boards (DAABs), understood as standing, project-embedded decision-makers capable of swift interim determinations while performance continues. The conclusion draws drafting implications for climate-aligned energy contracting.
1. Introduction
The global energy transition is often described as a shift in technology and infrastructure. For long-term energy contracts, it is more usefully read as juridical: a redefinition of the regulatory perimeter within which performance is expected to remain “stable”.[1] Anchored in multilateral commitments such as the Paris Agreement and the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (notably SDG 13),[2] the transition places legal frameworks under a particular kind of pressure.[3] It is not merely that regulation is changing. It is that change has become programmatic. Under the Paris Agreement, Parties are expected to communicate nationally determined contributions on a recurring cycle, and the regime is coupled with a periodic global stocktake that recalibrates ambition and, in practice, drives successive rounds of domestic regulatory tightening. For contracting parties, “change in law” is therefore less an episodic shock than a foreseeable rhythm of governance. Ex ante mechanisms for adjustment become, in that setting, not a matter of convenience, but of contractual survivability.
A familiar tension sits at the centre of this development. On the one hand, long-term projects continue to depend on the grammar of stability: pacta sunt servanda, the doctrine of acquired rights, and the contested promise of the internationalisation of State contracts. On the other hand, the same projects are performed in a regulatory environment increasingly structured by climate duties, administrative enforcement, and the prospect of litigation. The point is not that contracts have suddenly become fragile. The point is that they have always been political artefacts, and the transition merely makes that politics harder to postpone.[4]
This is particularly visible in extractive industries. Long-term petroleum and gas agreements have long served as more than legal bargains over price and performance. They are instruments through which risk, public revenue, and regulatory authority are organised across time. Their structural mutability is therefore not an anomaly. Regulatory change and shifting public interests are not external accidents that “interfere” with a neutral economic relationship. They are foreseeable forces that periodically test the allocation of risk reflected in the bargain, and, when the test is sufficiently intense, activate renegotiation.
This article examines the legal architecture of renegotiation in international energy contracting, treating dispute resolution not as a merely ex post forum, but as part of the governance design that keeps performance viable under accelerated regulatory change. In that perspective, the legal problem is not whether stability should matter. It is how stability is produced. If stability is treated as the immobilisation of the legal framework, it will predictably fail, and it will fail in the familiar way: by translating political disagreement into compensable loss.
In this article, “dynamic stability” denotes stability through orderly legal avenues for adjustment:[5] clauses and procedures that identify relevant change, impose duties of cooperation and good faith, and channel disagreement into staged processes so that performance can continue while the parties restore contractual equilibrium.[6] Yet the claim is not only doctrinal. Stability is not merely a function of drafting or formal renegotiation.[7] It also depends on whether parties can sustain cooperation, reciprocity, and a workable sense of fairness over time, a practical dimension that becomes sharper as regulatory change accelerates and renegotiation moves from exception to background condition.[8]
The question that follows is often framed as a test of traditional contractual techniques: can stabilization clauses withstand the evolving regulatory frameworks required for decarbonisation? The question is not wrong, but it risks misdescribing what such clauses can plausibly do. To the extent that stabilization is presented as legal immobility, it will overpromise and underdeliver. What stabilization can more credibly secure is a distribution of regulatory risk and a method of valuation, not the suppression of regulatory evolution itself.
If that is right, the institutional focus shifts. The energy transition, by its nature, introduces new investments, new contracts, and inevitably, disputes. It also changes the temporal structure of those disputes: disagreement is increasingly likely to arise while performance must continue, and while the parties remain exposed to iterative rounds of regulation. Arbitration may allocate responsibility ex post, and it may do so with authority and finality. Yet it is poorly suited to the task that the transition most insistently generates: the ongoing management of contractual equilibrium under accelerated “change in law”. The alternative explored here is contractual and procedural. It is dispute avoidance through Dispute Avoidance and Adjudication Boards (DAABs), conceived as standing, project-embedded decision-makers capable of swift interim determinations while performance continues.[9] FIDIC has recently reinforced this orientation by publishing a practice note focused on dispute avoidance through dispute boards, a sign that users increasingly seek early intervention techniques before disagreements harden into late-stage, high-cost proceedings.
The article’s central submission is straightforward. Under energy-transition conditions, stability is secured through contractually pre-arranged adjustment, not through the pretence of legal immobility.
2. Stabilization clauses: legal rigidity in the face of dynamic environmental imperatives
Stabilization clauses are often presented as the price of long-term investment in politically and legally uncertain environments. In capital-intensive sectors such as oil and gas, they have served as a credibility device: a way of reassuring investors that the regulatory perimeter of the project would not be re-written without consequence. The familiar shorthand is that such clauses “freeze” the applicable legal framework. Yet what matters is not the metaphor but the institutional function: stabilization promises to translate regulatory evolution into a manageable contractual event, rather than leaving it as an open-ended political risk.[10]
Stabilization is not a single technique but a family of techniques. At one end are freezing formulations, drafted to insulate the project from future legal change; at the other are economic equilibrium clauses, which proceed from the opposite premise: that change will occur, and that the question is how its economic impact will be valued, allocated, and, where appropriate, compensated. Even where stabilization cannot plausibly be read as disabling bona fide regulation pursued for legitimate public purposes, it may still operate as a bargaining and valuation device, shaping how regulatory change is priced ex post. Investment-law doctrine reinforces the practical point. The police powers doctrine and the “right to regulate” vocabulary tend to resist treating good-faith, non-discriminatory environmental measures as compensable takings. Stabilization language therefore rarely “stops” decarbonisation regulation. At most, it reorganises bargaining power, valuation, and the distribution of regulatory risk.
The limits of stabilization are often most visible where institutional capacity is weakest and the environmental stakes are highest. In such settings, disputes over pollution and clean-up obligations can be reframed as disputes over cost allocation: what appears, on paper, as environmental accountability becomes, in practice, an argument about “legitimate expenses” and regulatory gaps.[11] Stabilization clauses also function as interpretative anchors for domestic courts and tribunals, shaping how other contractual provisions are read and, indirectly, how responsibility is distributed. That interpretative weight may reassure investors and enhance a host State’s reputation as a contractual partner. Yet it also highlights an asymmetry built into the technique: credibility for investment may be purchased by making regulatory evolution more costly.[12] Stabilization language can therefore sit uneasily with the environmental reforms that climate obligations increasingly require.[13] The tension is not abstract. It is a recurring problem of translating public policy change into private entitlement. [14]
The extractive industries face a critical paradox as long-term contracts protected by stabilization clauses hinder states from adapting laws to meet climate goals without risking costly arbitration claims, a tension particularly acute in developing countries balancing investment needs with environmental obligations.[15] Indeed the rigidity of stabilization clauses protects investors but restricts states’ ability to implement necessary environmental laws, forcing them to choose between compensating investors for regulatory changes or facing costly arbitration claims, particularly under global climate commitments like the Paris Agreement.[16]
Considerations regarding stabilization clauses also encompass broader issues such as regulatory opportunism, information asymmetries, and the risks inherent in contractual inflexibility. These concerns become particularly salient within the context of the energy transition’s dynamic landscape, marked by rapid technological advancements, environmental shifts, and evolving policies.[17]
The discourse surrounding stabilization clauses in the context of energy transition is further enriched by contributions from scholars like S.N. Obulor,[18] who emphasizes the multifaceted nature of this transition, particularly in developing countries in the Global South, notably Sub-Saharan Africa. Obulor articulates that while the inevitability of energy transition is universally acknowledged, the breadth of its implications (spanning opportunities, challenges, and uncertainties) remains insufficiently explored.[19] Moreover, as noted by Z. A. Al Qurashi, the renegotiation of international petroleum agreements climaxes the struggle to balance investment protection with the evolving need for flexible environmental regulation, particularly in states heavily reliant on extractive industries.[20]
3. Arbitration: balancing sovereignty and investor protections in energy disputes
Against this backdrop, arbitration is frequently presented as the natural forum for managing the disputes of the transition: neutral, enforceable, and insulated from domestic pressures that may be perceived as bias. Its appeal in cross-border, long-term projects is obvious. Yet the claim that arbitration can “balance” investor rights and regulatory evolution should be treated with care. Arbitration can allocate responsibility ex post, and it can do so with authority. But the more the transition turns regulatory change into a foreseeable rhythm, the more the dispute is likely to arise while performance must continue. What is at stake is therefore not merely whether arbitration can decide, but whether ex post adjudication can plausibly govern an ongoing contractual equilibrium.[21]
The regulatory impetus is increasingly reinforced by adjudication. The Grand Chamber judgment in Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v Switzerland shows how climate-related duties may be articulated in human-rights terms, with foreseeable consequences for the regulatory space within which energy contracts are performed. Beyond its symbolic weight, the judgment confirms that climate governance is increasingly framed as a matter of enforceable legal obligations. For long-term energy contracts, this matters because it makes regulatory tightening more foreseeable, and therefore harder to treat as a remote ‘political risk’ external to the contractual bargain.[22]
At the same time, the investment-protection environment is itself in flux. The European Union and Euratom have withdrawn from the Energy Charter Treaty, with effect from 28 June 2025, signalling a recalibration of the balance between investment protection and climate policy space.[23]
However, the limitations of arbitration must also be acknowledged. First, arbitration’s reputation as an effective means of resolving disputes has suffered.[24] While users still value its worldwide enforceability, avoidance of specific legal systems/national courts, and the general flexibility of proceedings,[25] arbitration is no longer perceived as cost and time-efficient.[26] One reason for this may be that arbitration has evolved into a form of “off-shore litigation”, where extensive document production and multiple rounds of submissions are common to facilitate the arbitrators’ adjudicative task.[27] In contrast, settlement efforts by a proactive tribunal are often seen as a significant way to increase efficiency in arbitration.[28] Users increasingly value integrating adjudicative and non-adjudicative mechanisms in arbitration, prioritizing opportunities for amicable dispute resolution even within adversarial processes.[29] One example is the growing use of multi-tier or escalation clauses, which require mandatory negotiations or mediation before arbitration can proceed.[30] Indeed, while arbitration is often viewed as a streamlined and efficient alternative to litigation, it is, by its nature, a reactive process. Moreover, disputes are only addressed after they have escalated, which can exacerbate tensions and result in costly, time-consuming proceedings. As environmental regulations intensify and decarbonization efforts accelerate, the number of arbitration cases related to regulatory changes is expected to rise, placing even more pressure on arbitral tribunals to find solutions that balance investor protections with public interest.[31] This trend is not merely quantitative: it amplifies the structural legitimacy problem of asking ex post adjudication to ‘solve’ what is, in substance, an ongoing allocation of regulatory adjustment burdens across the life of the project.
Arbitration remains, by design, a mechanism of ex post responsibility allocation. The contention that arbitrators can’t adapt the contract through rewriting is based on the traditional distinction between jurisdictional arbitration (adjudicating rights and duties based on past conduct, known as legal disputes) and contractual arbitration (shaping future relations through contract modification). It may decide who bears loss after disruption, but it is poorly suited to the day-to-day governance of a long-term project when the immediate need is to keep performance on track while the regulatory framework evolves.
Conceptually, the question of whether arbitrators could engage in settlement efforts concerns the extent and limits of their powers to conduct and structure arbitration proceedings.[32] The shifting contours of international arbitration reveal a profound entanglement with the challenges of renegotiating stabilization clauses, where the assertion of sovereign regulatory prerogatives collides with the inviolability of contractual commitments.[33] Arbitral tribunals are increasingly compelled not only to adjudicate but to recalibrate agreements to align with the imperatives of decarbonization, exposing the limits of reactive frameworks and underscoring the need for anticipatory mechanisms capable of navigating the legal tensions of the energy transition.[34]
Yet, even in arbitration regimes that authorize proactive settlement facilitation, such as the ‘type three’ frameworks, the risk of perceived bias remains ever-present. One party may argue that the settlement process has been tilted unfairly in favor of the other. To mitigate this risk and safeguard the tribunal’s integrity, it is prudent to secure a waiver from the parties, renouncing their right to challenge the arbitrator on the basis of the settlement activities.[35] This ensures that both parties are fully committed to the process and preemptively addresses any concerns of bias, thus allowing the arbitrator to operate with the flexibility needed to foster meaningful dialogue and resolution.
4. Adaptive legal frameworks for the energy transition: harnessing the potential of Dispute Boards
If the problem is that disagreement increasingly arises while projects must continue to operate under iterative regulatory tightening, then a mechanism that arrives only after rupture is structurally mistimed. Dispute Boards, and in particular Dispute Avoidance and Adjudication Boards (DAABs), offer a different institutional logic: they embed interim decision-making into the life of the project.[36] Their promise is not that disputes disappear, but that disagreement can be processed without suspending performance, often through interim binding determinations under a “pay now, argue later” logic.[37] FIDIC’s recent emphasis on dispute avoidance through dispute boards, including its 2023 Practice Note,[38] reflects this orientation toward early intervention and project-embedded governance rather than late-stage adjudication.[39]
A salient feature is their interim binding effect, often summarised as “pay now, argue later”: compliance is expected in the first instance, while the dissatisfied party may later pursue arbitration or litigation. Boards may be constituted on a standing basis for the life of the project or appointed ad hoc; standing boards typically offer superior continuity, informational proximity, and genuine dispute-avoidance capacity.
What differentiates DAABs from stabilization clauses is their intrinsic adaptability, an essential characteristic in the energy sector, where regulatory, technological, and market fluctuations are both frequent and unpredictable. Stabilization clauses often exacerbate the rigidity that obstructs the adaptive evolution required for energy projects to remain viable.[40] In contrast, DAABs institutionalize continuous dialogue and implement proactive dispute resolution, allowing contractual frameworks to dynamically respond to emergent regulatory changes, such as the introduction of carbon pricing or emissions caps. The inherent inflexibility of static legal instruments, already highlighted by Al Faruque (2005), underscores the exigency for a more dynamic and responsive governance paradigm, of which DAABs are an expression.[41]
Rooted in Ian Macneil’s relational contract theory, DAABs ensure long-term energy agreements remain adaptable to regulatory, economic, and technological changes. [42] The concept of “open-endedness” underscores the necessity for long-term energy contracts to accommodate unforeseen developments adequately. This approach acknowledges that while certain risks may be foreseeable in principle, their specific manifestations and extents remain uncertain. Consequently, contractual frameworks should adopt a flexible stance, allowing for adjustments guided by principles of good faith and fairness.[43]
By providing continuous oversight and real-time dispute resolution, they minimize arbitration risks, preserve contractual integrity, and address the challenges of decarbonization-driven regulatory shifts,[44] as exemplified by FIDIC’s approach.[45]
The regular site visits and the close interaction with both parties enable DBs to offer opinions and guidance based on firsthand knowledge of the site. This approach aligns with the broader trend in international arbitration and adjudication, where tribunals are increasingly expected to integrate not just legal formalism but also a nuanced understanding of the practical realities of the sectors they adjudicate.
This institutional orientation is reflected in standard-setting practice. FIDIC has expressly promoted the dispute-avoidance function of dispute boards and issued dedicated guidance to foster best practice in their use.
This proposal suggests rethinking international energy contract governance, arguing that static frameworks like stabilization clauses are inadequate for the dynamic decarbonization landscape. Instead, Dispute Boards offer a flexible, real-time mechanism to align contracts with evolving regulations while preserving investment protections and supporting public policy goals.[46]
By integrating Dispute Boards into energy contracts, this approach proposes a pathway to addressing the legal, economic, and environmental complexities of the shift from fossil fuels to renewable energy. Such a framework might offer a more resilient legal architecture, balancing investor and state interests while fostering a transition that is legally sound, economically viable, and environmentally sustainable.[47] This possibility invites further examination of how legal structures can support the global energy transition in a more equitable and forward-looking manner.
If the objective is to preserve the bargain under foreseeable regulatory evolution, the drafting task is not to promise immobility, but to organise adjustment. Clauses should therefore do three things that standard stabilization language often leaves implicit: identify defined triggers for review, impose information and cooperation duties, and discipline renegotiation through timelines and escalation steps. In parallel, the contract should allocate interim decision-making to a project-embedded body capable of rapid determinations, so that performance is not held hostage to disagreement. The familiar objection is doctrinal. Renegotiation clauses risk being dismissed as mere “agreements to agree”, and thus treated as invalid or unenforceable in a number of jurisdictions. Yet that risk is not uniform.[48] English common law has tended to view agreements to negotiate as unenforceable, while many American jurisdictions, in more contemporary approaches, accept that duties to negotiate in good faith are not inherently void. The point, then, is not to romanticise renegotiation, but to draft it as an institution rather than an aspiration.
On this view, stabilization may be recast as calibrated protection of expectations: less a claim to legal immobility than a set of valuation and adjustment techniques (price review, equilibrium clauses, agreed formulas) through which the economic consequences of regulatory change are priced and allocated without denying the State’s regulatory prerogatives.
In the energy transition, the legal problem is not whether contracts should be stable, but how stability is legally produced. Treating stabilization as legal immobility overstates what such clauses can secure and understates the legitimacy, and the predictability, of regulatory evolution. A contractual architecture that combines calibrated stabilization, structured renegotiation, and DAAB-style dispute avoidance offers a more credible way to preserve the bargain while accommodating decarbonisation-driven public policy.
[1] Mersinia, I., & Penttinen, S.-L. (2017). Introduction: Examining different aspects of the energy transition. In S.-L. Penttinen & I. Mersinia (Eds.), Energy transitions: Regulatory and policy trends (pp. 1-8). Cambridge: Intersentia.
[2] United Nations. (2015). Paris Agreement. United Nations Treaty Series.
[3] Bodansky, D. (2016). The Paris Climate Change Agreement: A New Hope? American Journal of International Law, 110(2), pp. 288-319. Rajamani, L. (2016). Ambition and differentiation in the 2015 Paris Agreement: Interpretative possibilities and underlying politics. International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 65(2), pp. 493-514.
[4] Nalule, V. R., Heffron, R. J., & Olawuyi, D. S. (2023). Renegotiating contracts for the energy transition in the extractives industry. Springer Nature (Just Transitions series). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-46258-0 [year TO VERIFY: 2023 per Crossref, 2024 per HBKU]; Mersinia, I., & Penttinen, S.-L. (2017). Introduction: Examining different aspects of the energy transition. In S.-L. Penttinen & I. Mersinia (Eds.), Energy transitions: Regulatory and policy trends (pp. 1-8). Intersentia; Martin, J. G. (2004). Sustainable Development: Impacts of Current Trends on Oil and Gas Development. Journal of Land Resources and Environmental Law, 24(2), pp. 257-275 [pages TO VERIFY].
[5] Talus, K. (2023). Adapting international natural gas and LNG agreements in the light of the energy transition. Journal of World Energy Law & Business, 16(6), 492; De Jong, S. (2011). Towards Global Energy Governance: How to Patch the Patchwork. In International Development Policy: Energy and Development (pp. 21-43). Palgrave Macmillan; Pagnoni, G. A., & Roche, S. (2015). The Renaissance of Renewable Energy (pp. 27-28). Cambridge University Press [relevance to this proposition TO VERIFY].
[6] Hailes, O., & Viñuales, J. E. (2023). The energy transition at a critical juncture. Journal of International Economic Law, 26(4), pp. 627–648.
[7] Vinogradov, S., & Worika, I. L. (2003). Global stakeholders: The impact of international law on the resources industry. In International Resources Law and Projects, Mineral Law Series (Vol. 1999, No. 2, pp. 1-22); Le Billon, P. (2003). Getting it done: Instruments of enforcement. In I. Bannon & P. Collier (Eds.), Natural resources and violent conflict: Options and actions (pp. 215-286). Washington, D.C.: The World Bank. [Vinogradov & Worika: year, volume and pages TO VERIFY]
[8] Asif, M. (2022). Introduction to the Four-Dimensional Energy Transition. In M. Asif (Ed.), The 4Ds of Energy Transition: Decarbonization, Decentralization, Decreasing Use and Digitalization (pp. 1-10). Wiley, p. 5 [pinpoint TO VERIFY].
[9] Solimene, F. (2014). Use of FIDIC forms in the oil and gas construction sector and possible amendments to the Yellow and Silver Books. Journal of World Energy Law & Business, 7(6), 558-571 [pinpoint TO VERIFY]; Bernardini, P. (2008). Stabilization and adaptation in oil and gas investments. Journal of World Energy Law & Business, 1(1), 100.
[10] Al Faruque, A. (2005). Stability in petroleum contracts: Rhetoric and reality—Lessons from the experiences of selected developing countries and economies in transition (1980–2002) [Doctoral dissertation, University of Dundee], p. 261. [pinpoint TO VERIFY]
[11] Gehne, K., & Brillo, R. (2014). Stabilization Clauses in International Investment Law: Beyond Balancing and Fair and Equitable Treatment. Beitrage zum Transnationalen Wirtschaftsrecht, pp. 29-30. Institute of Economic Law, Transnational Economic Law Research Center (TELC), School of Law, Martin Luther University Halle-Wittenberg. [year, series and pages TO VERIFY: the paper exists as NCCR Working Paper No. 2013/46 and as Beiträge zum Transnationalen Wirtschaftsrecht, Heft 143 (2017)]
[12] Africa Centre for Energy Policy. (2014). Ghana’s new petroleum agreements show major improvements as risks levels reduce — The cases of Ghana-AGM and Ghana-COLA/Medea petroleum agreements. Africa Centre for Energy Policy.
[13] Boisson de Chazournes, L., & Ruggeri Abonnat, E. (2023). Contract and Treaty Interpretation in International Arbitration. In S. Kröll, A. K. Bjorklund & F. Ferrari (Eds.), Cambridge Compendium of International Commercial and Investment Arbitration (pp. 1723-1750). Cambridge University Press [SOURCE TO VERIFY: the chapter does not address stabilization clauses; a supporting source is needed for this proposition].
[14] Bradbrook, A. (2016). Energy and law — Searching for new directions. In D. Stephens & P. Babie (Eds.), Imagining law: Essays in conversation with Judith Gardam (pp. 13-33). University of Adelaide Press.
[15] Nalule, V. R., et al., (2023), Supra nota 4, Chapter 4, p. 84.
[16] Solimene, F., (2014), Supra nota 9 [SOURCE TO VERIFY: the article predates the Paris Agreement and does not support this proposition].
[17] Singh, J. (2015, September 9). Stabilization Clauses in Investment Contracts in Developing Countries. University of California, Berkeley, School of Law (Boalt Hall); National Law School of India University, Bangalore. SSRN Working Paper, https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2658185.
[18] Obulor, S. N., (2021). Stabilisation Clauses as an Impediment to Energy Transition in Petroleum-Producing Sub-Saharan African Countries in Post-Covid-19. OGEL, 5 (2021), special issue “COVID-19 and the Energy Transition”.
[19] Obulor’s analysis delves into three interconnected phenomena within petroleum contracts that are prevalent in the regulatory landscapes of petroleum-producing developing countries: the internationalization of contracts, the use of stabilization clauses, and the reliance on international arbitration. These elements are often employed as risk management strategies in petroleum investment contracts and are ubiquitous across a majority of such agreements in these regions.
[20] Al Qurashi, Z. A. (2005). Renegotiation of International Petroleum Agreements, Journal of International Arbitration, 22(4), 261-300
[21] Boisson de Chazournes, L., & Ruggeri Abonnat, E. (2023), supra nota 13 [pinpoint and support TO VERIFY].
[22] European Court of Human Rights. (2024). Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland (App. No. 53600/20, Grand Chamber, 9 April 2024).
[23] European Commission, “Energy Charter”, https://energy.ec.europa.eu/topics/international-cooperation/international-organisations-and-initiatives/energy-charter_en (withdrawal notified to the depositary on 27 June 2024, effective 28 June 2025).
[24] L. Greenwood, “A Window of Opportunity? Building a Short Period of Time into Arbitral Rules in Order for Parties to Explore Settlement,” Arbitration International, 27(2), 2011, 199 et seq
[25] P. Friedland & S. Brekoulakis, 2018 International Arbitration Survey: The Evolution of International Arbitration (White & Case and Queen Mary University, 2018), available at www.arbitration.qmul.ac.uk/research/2018/, last accessed 21 September 2020; N. Alexander et al., SIDRA International Dispute Resolution Survey: 2020 Final Report (Singapore Management University, 2020), available at https://sidra.smu.edu.sg/sites/sidra.smu.edu.sg/files/survey/index.html, last accessed 21 September 2020
[26] P. Friedland & S. Brekoulakis, 2018 International Arbitration Survey: The Evolution of International Arbitration (White & Case and Queen Mary University, 2018), 8, Chart 4.
[27] S. Elsing, “Procedural Efficiency in International Arbitration: Choosing the Best of Both Legal Worlds,” Zeitschrift für Schiedsverfahren (German Arbitration Journal), 9(3), 2011, 115; S. Kröll, “Promoting Settlements in Arbitration: The Role of the Arbitrator,” in P. Shaughnessy and S. Tung (Eds.), The Powers and Duties of an Arbitrator: Liber Amicorum Pierre A. Karrer (Kluwer, 2017), 215
[28] K.-P. Berger & J. O. Jensen, “The Arbitrator’s Mandate to Facilitate Settlement,” Fordham International Law Journal, 40(3), 2017, 888; A. Reeg, “Should an International Arbitral Tribunal Engage in Settlement Facilitation?” in P. Shaughnessy and S. Tung (Eds.), The Powers and Duties of an Arbitrator: Liber Amicorum Pierre A. Karrer (Kluwer, 2017), 272
[29] K.-P. Berger & J. O. Jensen, “The Arbitrator’s Mandate to Facilitate Settlement,” Fordham International Law Journal, 40(3), 2017, 898; T. J. Stipanowich & Z. P. Ulrich, “Commercial Arbitration and Settlement: Empirical Insights into the Roles Arbitrators Play,” in T. E. Carbonneau and N. Welsh (Eds.), Penn State Yearbook on Arbitration and Mediation, Vol. VI (West Academic, 2014), 28–9.
[30] K.-P. Berger & J. O. Jensen, “The Arbitrator’s Mandate to Facilitate Settlement,” Fordham International Law Journal, 40(3), 2017, 898
[31] Boisson de Chazournes, L., & Ruggeri Abonnat, E. (2023), supra nota 13 [pinpoint and support TO VERIFY].
[32] M. Collins, “Do International Arbitral Tribunals Have Any Obligations to Encourage Settlement of the Disputes Before Them?” Arbitration International, 19(3), 2003, 333–43
[33] Kröll, S., & Kerkhoff, T. (2023). Settlement efforts and contract adaptation by arbitral tribunals. In S. Kröll, A. K. Bjorklund & F. Ferrari (Eds.), Cambridge Compendium of International Commercial and Investment Arbitration (Part V, Chapter 30, pp. 917-956). Cambridge University Press.
[34] Nalule, V. R., et al. (2023), supra nota 4 [chapter and pinpoint TO VERIFY: the book has five chapters].
[35] Raeschke-Kessler, H. (2005). The arbitrator as settlement facilitator. Arbitration International, 21(4), 523-536.
[36] Charrett, D. (2009). Dispute Boards and Construction Contracts. Society of Construction Law Australia, p. 4. [publication details TO VERIFY]
[37] Solimene, F. (2014), supra nota 9 [pinpoint TO VERIFY].
[38] FIDIC. (2023). Practice Note I: Dispute Avoidance, focusing on dispute boards (Issue no. 1, version 1). FIDIC Dispute Avoidance and Adjudication Forum.
[39] Macdonald, C., Grethe-Watanabe, P., Lamprou, N., & Pardailhe-Galabrun, K. (2023, 7 December). New FIDIC Practice Note: Dispute Avoidance, Focusing on Dispute Boards. ArbitrationLinks, Linklaters [authors TO VERIFY].
[40] [SOURCE TO VERIFY: FIDIC (2023), supra nota 38, does not address stabilization clauses; a supporting source is needed for this proposition.]
[41] Al Faruque, A. (2005), supra nota 10, p. 261 [pinpoint TO VERIFY].
[42] Macneil, I. R. (1978). Contracts: Adjustment of Long-term Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law. Northwestern University Law Review, 72, 854, p. 868 [TO VERIFY against the original].
[43] Campbell, D., & Harris, D. (1993). Flexibility in Long-Term Contractual Relationships: The Role of Co-Operation. Journal of Law and Society, 20(2), 166. DOI: 10.2307/1410166.
[44] FIDIC (2023), supra nota 38, p. 11 [pinpoint TO VERIFY].
[45] FIDIC (2023), supra nota 38, p. 10 [pinpoint TO VERIFY].
[46] Boisson de Chazournes, L., & Ruggeri Abonnat, E. (2023), supra nota 13 [pinpoint and support TO VERIFY].
[47] Nalule, V. R., et al. (2023), supra nota 4.
[48] Kolo, A., & Wälde, T. W. (2000). Renegotiation and contract adaptation in international investment projects. Journal of World Investment, 1(1), 5-57.
Leave a Reply